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 Abstract 
Neural circuits associated with response conflict are active during deception. Here we use 
transcranial magnetic stimulation to examine for the first time whether competing responses in 
primary motor cortex can be used to detect lies. Participants used their little finger or thumb to 
respond either truthfully or deceitfully regarding facial familiarity. Motor-evoked-potentials (MEPs) from 
muscles associated with both digits tracked the development of each motor plan. When preparing to 
deceive, the MEP of the non-responding digit (i.e. the plan corresponding to the truth) exceeds the 
MEP of the responding digit (i.e. the lie), whereas a mirror-reversed pattern occurs when telling the 
truth. This give away response conflict interacts with the time of stimulation during a speeded reaction 
period. Lies can even activate digit-specific cortical representations when only verbal responses are 
made. Our findings support neurobiological models which blend cognitive decision-making with motor 




► Single-pulse TMS can be used to study intra-hemispheric response preparation. ► Response 
competition dynamics can differentiate between truth-telling and deceit. ► Lying involuntarily activates 
motor plans associated with the truth in M1. 
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 1. Introduction 
Deception is commonplace in human communication, engaging multiple cognitive processes 
( [Ekman, 2009] and [Spence, 2004]). Social interactions often involve deceptive behaviours, used to 
maximize personal gain or avoid punishment ( [Nardini, 1987] and [DePaulo et al., 2003]). At present 
the most widely used tool for lie-detection is the polygraph (Pollina et al., 2004) which is based on 
indirect peripheral physiological measures. Recent imaging studies have demonstrated that neural 
circuits associated with response conflict and response inhibition are strongly implicated in deception 
( [Abe et al., 2006], [Abe et al., 2007], [Bhatt et al., 2009], [Kozel et al., 2004], [Lee et al., 
2010], [Langleben et al., 2005], [Nunez et al., 2005] and [Schumacher et al., 2010]). Indeed, cognitive 
models of deception posit the activation of the truth as one of the early processes underlying 
deception, which could lead to conflict. However, to date the involuntary activation of a population of 
neurons representing the truth in lying has not been demonstrated. 
Several researchers have noted the consistent involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), areas associated with cognitive control and conflict 
monitoring, in deceptive behaviour ( [Abe et al., 2006], [Bhatt et al., 2009], [Lee et al., 2010], [Nunez 
et al., 2005] and [Schumacher et al., 2010]). Abe et al. (2006) used positron emission tomography 
(PET) to show that the activation of conflict monitoring areas such as the ACC is specific for denying 
knowledge of an event rather than confabulating knowledge of an event. In a study by Nunez et al. 
(2005), increased activation within the ACC and DLPFC was found particularly when participants 
falsified autobiographical facts. They also found parallel behavioural effects expressed in increased 
reaction time (RT) for deceptive responses, which they attributed to interference from a potent true 
response, similar to the effects found in traditional conflict paradigms such as the Stroop and the 
Flanker tasks ( [Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974] and [Stroop, 1935]). More recently Bhatt and colleagues 
(2009) asked participants to deliberately misidentify familiar faces in a format similar to police ‘line-
ups’ used with crime suspects. Triads of faces, with one face being shown prior to the task, were 
streamed, and participants were instructed to deny recognition of the familiar face and instead 
indicate familiarity of an alternative novel face. As in previous work with verbal questioning, imaging 
data showed that increased activation in a network of areas, including the ACC and DLPFC, was 
associated with deceptive behaviour. 
To the extent that the act of deception entails suppression of a potent true response and the 
generation of an alternative, it is not surprising that the ACC and the DLPFC appear to be highly 
active. Both of these areas have been strongly implicated in error processing, response competition, 
and conflict monitoring (e.g.[Botvinick et al., 1999], [Braver et al., 2003] and [Carter et al., 1998]). 
However, despite the wealth of literature on response conflict, and the emerging literature on lie 
detection, to date, no empirical attempts have been made to utilise the cortical dynamics of response 
conflict for the detection of a lie. Seymour and Schumacher (2009) have perhaps come closest to 
such an attempt, by using electromyography (EMG) to detect conflict at the motor output level. In their 
task, which is similar to intentional false responding in facial recognition, participants had to falsely 
indicate that some previously presented words were new, whilst responding truthfully to a second 
group of previously presented words. Additionally a third ‘filler’ group of unseen words was also 
shown, requiring a truthful (‘new’) response. In this experiment, responses were given with either the 
right or the left hand and EMG was recorded from two corresponding muscles. Analysis of correct 
trials revealed a greater number of partial errors (partial activation of the incorrect response) in the 
first condition, in which false responding was required. The authors interpreted this pattern as 
evidence for a conflict in the response preparation stage within a serial model incorporating 
competition between (1) automatic familiarity and (2) a slow level-headed recollection process. Thus, 
falsifying information reliably resulted in conflict between responding muscles. 
The transformation of an abstract cognitive conflict (induced by deceptive behaviour) into a tangible 
motor conflict opens new avenues for the development of lie detection techniques, and can also shed 
light on the mechanisms underlying motor decision making. Verbal yes/no responses, which serve as 
the basis for most lie detection research, can be easily substituted with manual responses, requiring 
consistent activation of two distinct muscles. [Cisek, 2006] and [Cisek, 2007] constructed a model, 
based upon single-cell recording experiments in the macaque brain, simulating how plans for moving 
a digit in two opposing directions compete in pre-motor areas. According to the model the selection of 
a single motor output is achieved via mutual inhibitory competition between neural populations 
representing different directions for movement. He speculated that motor decision-making processes 
are constantly biased by projections from other brain areas. Importantly Cisek's computational 
simulations and the confirmatory neural data suggest that response selection entails parallel response 
preparation for multiple candidate responses. Therefore, the process of selecting a response does not 
necessary entail a discrete selection mechanism. Indeed, in the past decade evidence has 
accumulated in favour of such parallel activation views of response conflict which cast doubt on the 
traditional idea (Pashler, 1991) of a serial selection process with discrete stages of selection and 
motor preparation (e.g. [Desoto et al., 2001], [Fleming et al., 2009], [Taylor et al., 2007] and [Verleger 
et al., 2009]). 
Here, we examine whether the dynamics of response competition, as expressed in primary motor 
cortex (M1), can be used to reveal deceptive behaviour, by making use of single-pulse transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS). In this approach, muscular responses induced by TMS, known as motor 
evoked potentials (MEPs), are used to index the strength of an action tendency in M1 or adjacent 
premotor areas (cf.[Bestmann et al., 2008], [Gandevia and Rothwell, 1987] and [Kiers et al., 1997]). 
Single pulses, given at different moments prior to response execution but after stimulus presentation, 
can provide information about the dynamics of the interaction between two responses. For 
instance, Verleger et al. (2009) used a bimanual flanker task to compare the strength of incorrect 
premature response representations (activated by the flankers) with that of correct representations. 
Participants moved their left or right index fingers, as directed by a central arrow, whilst ignoring 
compatible or incompatible peripheral stimuli. Ipsilateral and contralateral M1 were stimulated at 
various moments prior to response execution. MEPs were found to be larger for the responding hand 
compared with the non-responding hand. However, this effect was modulated by the irrelevant 
flankers, e.g. MEPs in the responding hand were larger in compatible conditions compared with 
incompatible or neutral conditions. Crucially, MEPs of the non-responding hand decreased closer to 
response execution and the reverse pattern was evident for MEPs of the responding hand. Thus, the 
relationship between the MEP amplitude of two responses can in principal be used to reveal how 
premature or even concealed response tendencies evolve during motor preparation. 
In the current series of studies, binary choices concerning the facial recognition of famous and non-
famous people were used to frame the cognitive act of deception within a response-conflict paradigm. 
Participants used their right little finger or thumb (or an associated verbal response in Experiment 3) 
to deceptively or truthfully indicate facial familiarity. By administering TMS prior to response execution 
in both truthful and deceitful conditions, we could compare the MEPs linked to the two competing 
responses. We predicted that the MEP of the non-responding digit should be larger when lying, 
particularly in the period immediately after stimulus onset, because of automatic activation of this 
objectively correct motor response. Such a finding would demonstrate the potential of highly localised 
motor activity to reveal deceitful behaviour. It would also help elucidate how stimulus presentation 
triggers the preparation of multiple responses within a single effector, casting further doubt on the 
notion of an isolated serial selection stage during motor decision making. 
 2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
Eight right-handed participants (5 male; mean age = 26, SD = 3.4) were tested. Participants were 
screened for contraindications for TMS, and also their ability to relax their muscles fully between 
manual responses. They were compensated financially for their time. The study was approved by the 
City University Psychology Department Ethics Committee. 
2.1.2. Stimuli 
Sixteen faces served as stimuli. Four were of famous politicians and four were of famous film 
actors/actresses (in both cases half male, half female; pictures found online). For each famous 
person, the face of a non-famous person from the Karolinskaor NimStimstimulus sets ( [Lundqvist et 
al., 1998] and [Tottenham et al., 2009]) was matched on sex, skin colour, gaze direction and facial 
expression. All faces were presented as greyscale 100 × 130 pixels portraits (∼4.94 × 5.81° visual 
angle). 
2.1.3. Apparatus 
E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider et al., 2002) ran on a lab PC to present stimuli and control TMS pulses. 
Subjects sat 50 cm in front of a 19-inch CRT monitor refreshing at 100 Hz. The right hand rested on a 
foam pad, positioned palm down with thumb and little finger each touching digital response keys (Fig. 
1). Electromyography and TMS were combined to measure MEPs from two intrinsic muscles of the 
right hand (the Abductor DigitiMinimi, or ADM, and first dorsal interosseous, or FDI) using standard 
methods (cf. Makris et al., 2011). 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of experimental procedures. (A) Experiment 1. Participants were prompted to continuously 
fixate at the centre of the monitor and to use their thumb and little finger to indicate whether the face shown 
was that of a famous person or not once they heard an auditory imperative stimulus. During this preparation 
interval a single pulse of TMS was administered on 25% of trials, either 200, 500 or 800 ms after face onset. 
Depending on participant counter-balancing, the example stimulus shown here could require either a lie or the 
truth. (B) Experiment 2. Here, face onset served as the reaction signal (i.e. there was no preparation interval). 
Stimulation was administered either 0, 300, or 600 ms after stimulus onset on the majority (90%) of trials. 
Each participant lied and told the truth about all stimuli, counterbalanced across the different blocks. (C) 
Experiment 3. Here, a verbal response (“yes” or “no”) was used whilst the hand remained completely relaxed. 
Participants again lied about different stimuli in different blocks. However, the preparatory interval was 
reinstated, with TMS delivered 20, 220 or 520 ms after stimulus onset (50% of trials) prior to an auditory go 
signal. Note that the verbal responses had previously been associated with manual responses during a 
training phase. 
EMG recording. Two 22 mm × 28 mm surface Ag/AgCl EMG electrodes recorded from the Abductor 
DigitiMinimi (ADM) of the right hand. Two others recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) of 
the same hand. EMG (bandpass filtered 20–450 Hz) was collected at 1000 Hz via a 13 bit A/D 
Biometrics Datalink system (version 7.5, Biometrics Ltd., Ladysmith, VA, U.S.A., 2008) and stored on 
a dedicated PC. EMG was also passed to a speaker to provide a warning when muscles were not 
fully relaxed. Participants were prompted to monitor their motor activity by relaxing their muscle 
whenever loud muscle noise persisted between responses. 
TMS protocol. Pulses were applied using a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil (external casing diameter 
∼90 mm for each loop) connected to a MagstimRapid2 biphasic stimulator (The Magstim Co. Ltd., 
Whitland, Carmarthenshire, U.K.). The coil was held tangentially to the skull, over the optimal spot at 
the left M1 to elicit MEPs in both the ADM and FDI, with the handle pointing backwards/laterally 
approximately midway between the saggital and coronal planes. Intensity of pulses was set around 
110–117% of resting motor threshold (RMT) in order to elicit MEPs of around 1 mV amplitude in both 
the ADM and the FDI. Individual RMTs were determined prior to the experiment as the minimal 
intensity required to elicit an MEP ∼50 μV in amplitude (peak to peak) in at least 3 out of 6 single 
pulses when the hand was fully relaxed. A post-report form was used to document any adverse 
effects of TMS (suspected seizures, syncope, headaches, muscular discomfort and anxiety) which 
are reported elsewhere (Hadar et al., in press). 
2.2. Statistical analysis 
Data was aligned to the time of TMS and analysed offline. Each MEP was visually inspected for EMG 
activity in the 300 ms preceding TMS. The decision to reject trials was based on the detection of EMG 
activity greater than 50 μV peak to peak within this time window. Such trials were discarded. In all 
experiments reported here this filtering procedure included the exclusion of trials in which a response 
was given prior to pulse delivery. The EMG screening was conducted using a display that showed 
digital signals aligned to TMS pulses, but provided no indication of experimental condition. Peak-to-
peak MEP amplitude was then calculated for correct trials. For each participant, amplitudes were z-
transformed (by separately combining all data for the FDI and ADM) in order to give an equivalent 
measure for the two responses. Medians were then taken for the different conditions. Inferential 
statistics were two-tailed, with Greenhouse–Geisser corrections where appropriate. 
2.3. Design and procedure 
A four factor (3 × 2 × 2 × 2) repeated-measures design was employed. The first factor was stimulation 
interval (TMS 200,500 or 800 ms after face onset). The second factor, honesty, compared truth to 
deceit. The third factor, face type, contrasted famous and non-famous faces, yielding lies that were 
either denials or confabulations. The fourth factor, digit, contrasted MEPs recorded from the little 
finger and thumb. These were re-coded as ‘responding’ and ‘non- responding’ digit according to 
participant's digit-response mapping (little finger/thumb presses mapped to “yes”/“no” responses), 
which was reversed for half of the sample. 
The allocation of faces to lie and truth conditions was counterbalanced across subjects in the 
following manner. The sixteen faces were divided into four sets, each containing two famous and two 
matched non-famous faces. Each participant was required to lie about just one set and tell the truth 
about the remaining three sets of faces. However, just one of the three truth sets was selected for 
TMS. Four distinct combinations of one lie and one truth set were therefore prepared for TMS trials, 
with a quarter of participants receiving each combination. The 16 faces were each presented six times 
during an experimental block. Single-pulse TMS was administered in one half (i.e. three) of the 
presentations of (1) the lie set and (2) the selected truth set (so once at each stimulation interval). The 
remaining two sets of truth faces served only as fillers, in order to dilute the TMS trials. Hence, each 
block consisted of 96 trials in pseudo-randomised order except that TMS could not occur on two 
consecutive trials. Seven such blocks generated 672 trials, containing 14 TMS trials at each 
combination of interval, honesty, and face-type. 
Before starting the experiment, participants answered 30 simple ‘Yes’/‘No’ questions (e.g. ‘do you 
speak English?’) to practice the response mapping and ensure that they could relax hand muscles 
between responses. They were then shown two famous and two non-famous faces and told to lie 
when asked by the computer about these specific people. On each experimental trial, participants 
fixated the word “famous?” for 600 ms before a face appeared. They then prepared but withheld their 
response until the presentation of an auditory imperative stimulus (a pure tone) after another 800 ms 
(see Fig. 1a). Following their response, a blank inter-trial interval (ITI) of 500–1500 ms preceded the 
next trial. 
 3. Results and discussion 
Accuracy data was averaged across the sample revealing an overall error rate of 6.8% (SD = 5.7%). 
No significant differences in accuracy were found between the lie and truth conditions. Incorrect trials 
were excluded when deriving MEP measures. 
The complex design balanced competing demands regarding the duration of the experiment, and the 
desirable frequencies of lies, TMS pulses, and responses with each digit. To reflect reality, lying was 
made less likely than telling the truth. TMS was therefore more likely in trials where participants lied 
(to keep the overall stimulation rate down). These facts suggest caution when interpreting the main 
effect of honesty, which may have been influenced by learnt expectancies. Interactions with digit are 
therefore critical, as the a priori likelihood of reacting with the responding and non-responding digits 
was equal and independent of all other factors. With this in mind, MEP data were submitted to a 
3 × 2 × 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA. Crucially, the ANOVA revealed that honesty (truth versus 
lie) affected MEP size differently in responding compared with non-responding digits, thereby 
confirming the existence of suppressed motor tendencies in M1 during deception 
(F(1,7) = 13.59, p < 0.01, ; Fig. 2b). Paired sample t-tests on this averaged data (Fig. 2b) 
highlighted that in deceitful responses, the MEPs of the non-responding digit were significantly larger 
than those of the responding digit (t(7) = 2.89, p < 0.05) whilst the reverse pattern was confirmed for 
truth telling (t(7) = 2.92, p < 0.05). Hence, in deception, as in other situations of response conflict, a 
motor plan is generated automatically for the “incorrect” response (Fig. 2c). Of course in deception, 
this incorrect response represents the truth. In this experiment, the three-way interaction between 
honesty, digit and interval was not significant (F(1,7) = 0.23, p = 0.97), signifying a relatively 
consistent two-way interaction across the three stimulation intervals (Fig. 2a). This may seem odd, 
because at some point the motor plan for the executed response must come to dominate over the 
non-responding digit. We hypothesised that competition between the two populations of neurons is 
resolved later, within RT itself, rather than within the motor preparation interval. 
 
Fig. 2. Results from Experiment 1, showing activity of the neural population associated with the non-
responding digit in lying but not in truth telling. Error bars denote standard errors. Asterisks (*) denote 
statistical significance for the key pairwise comparisons reported in the main text. (A) Mean of all participants’ 
median peak-to-peak MEP z-scores in Experiment 1, presenting the full set of conditions. (B) The same data 
are shown for responding and non-responding digits in lie and truth trials, having been collapsed across 
stimulation intervals in line with the results of the ANOVA (see main text). (C) Average MEPs for the Abductor 
DigitiMinimi (ADM) and First Dorsal Interosseous (FDI) of a single subject from Experiment 1 at stimulation 
interval 200 ms. This participant used the thumb (FDI) to indicate ‘yes’ and the little finger (ADM) for ‘no’. In 
both ‘lie’ conditions (i.e. lies made in response to either famous or non-famous faces) but not in the 
corresponding ‘true’ conditions, the MEP of the non-responding digit (ADM when falsely claiming recognition, 
FDI when falsely denying recognition) appears more active than that of the responding digit. 
To verify such temporal modulation, in Experiment 2 we asked subjects to respond immediately 
following face onset, and measured MEPs within the RT (Fig. 1b). We also addressed a potential 
shortcoming in terms of the ecological validity of our deception paradigm, by introducing some free 
choice into the decision to lie. Participants were again presented with a stream of familiar and 
unfamiliar faces, but were required to intentionally misidentify a different group of faces of their 
choice in each block. To manage the extra demands this change placed on memory, groups of faces 
were now defined by straightforward features (non-famous men, non famous women, actors and 
politicians). The only constraint was that by the end of the session participant should have lied about 
each of the four face groups comprising the full stimulus set. 
4. Experiment 2 
4.1. Method 
Experiment 2 used the same practice session, stimuli, apparatus and statistical analyses as 
Experiment 1. Thirteen right-handed participants were tested. One participant was rejected following 
data analysis, because they had < 5 MEPs per condition after screening for muscular pre-activation 
leaving a final sample of 12 (7 females, mean age = 25.6, SD = 6.1). 
4.2. Design and procedure 
Unlike Experiment 1, there was no requirement to withhold a response: the preparatory cue 
(“famous?”; 1000 ms) preceded the onset of a face, and participants then responded as quickly as 
possible, initiating a blank ITI of 3000–4000 ms. TMS was delivered within the reaction period, after 0, 
300 or 600 ms.In each of four experimental blocks, participants lied about a different group of four 
faces (film stars, politicians, non-famous men, non-famous women) with the order reflecting the 
participant's own choice, noted down privately (e.g. ‘block 1-politicians’). Hence each participant lied 
and told the truth equally often about each group of stimuli across the experiment. This arrangement 
meant that, unlike Experiment 1, one digit was used more often (75% of the time) in any given block, 
with little finger and thumb each being favoured in two out of four blocks. In each block, each of the 
four groups of faces was sampled repeatedly at random (with replacement) 27 times, to yield 9 
presentations for each of the three stimulation intervals. Hence each block contained 108 stimulation 
trials (36 trials per TMS interval). The addition of 12 no-stimulation trials, comprising 3 random 
samples from each face group, yielded 120 trials per block. In this design, lies always used the 
favoured (75% likely) digit, whereas 1/3rd of truth trials (those from the same higher-order category as 
the lie set; famous or non-famous) used the non-favoured (25% likely) digit. For this reason, MEPs 
were not analysed from this non-favoured subset of truth trials, guaranteeing that the overall bias 
towards advanced preparation of the responding digit would be identical between truthful and 
deceitful conditions. 
 5. Results and discussion 
Mean incorrect responses for this sample remained relatively low (mean = 12.3%, SD = 7.1) and no 
significant differences in accuracy were found between levels of the honesty factor. A repeated-
measures ANOVA comparing MEP size of the responding and non-responding digit for truthful and 
deceptive responses across the three stimulation intervals showed main effects of interval 
(F(2,22) = 6.81, p < 0.05, ) and digit (F(1,11) = 6.88, p < 0.05, ). The former 
showed how total corticospinal excitability increased towards the execution of the motor plan. The 
latter confirmed the overall greater excitation of the neural population controlling the responding digit 
compared with that representing the non-responding digit (Fig. 3a). In itself, this latter finding is trivial, 
because for this particular experiment there was a greater a priori expectancy of response for the 
responding digit: one digit was used on 75% of trials, and all the reported data comes from trials 
where the responding digit corresponds to this favoured digit. However, digit and interval interacted 
significantly (F(2,22) = 6.08, p < 0.05, ) demonstrating that across the three stimulation 
intervals there was a progressive selection of just one response (Fig. 3a) over and above any learnt 
expectations. Critically, as predicted, this two-way interaction was further modulated by honesty 
(F(2,22) = 3.79, p < 0.05, ). This three-way interaction (Fig. 3b) was investigated with three 
2 × 2 ANOVAs crossing the digit and honesty factors for each time of stimulation. A significant 
interaction was found only at the 300 ms stimulation interval (F(1,11) = 6.35, p < 0.05, ). 
Follow-up paired t-tests highlighted that this interaction stemmed from the significantly larger MEP of 
the responding finger when telling the truth relative to when lying (t(11) = 2.50, p < 0.05) and the 
marginally significant increase in the non-responding finger when lying relative to telling the truth 
(t = 2.17, p = 0.053). Hence, this interaction corroborates our results from Experiment 1: lying appears 
to generate a response conflict, but under time pressure the “wrong” response (the truth) develops 
only briefly (around 300 ms after stimulus onset) with a correction having occurred by 600 ms. 
 
Fig. 3. (A) Digit by interval interaction in Experiment 2, illustrating the progressive selection of one response 
over the other in M1 during the decision-making process. (B) Further modulation of this interaction depending 
upon honesty of response, emphasising a significant digit by honesty interaction, but only in the middle 
stimulation interval. (C) Significant three-way (interval by digit by honesty) interaction in Experiment 3, where 
verbal responses were given without the need for hand motor planning. The digit by honesty interaction was 
significant only in the middle stimulation interval, showing a transient increase in the MEP of the non-
responding digit in lying but not in truth telling. 
In our first two experiments, MEP data was often contaminated by both failures to relax hand muscles 
fully between key presses and early onset of voluntary muscle contraction, resulting in the mean 
exclusion of 29% (SD = 14%) of trials in Experiment 1 and 24.8% (SD = 12%) of trials in Experiment 2 
(but in equal numbers regardless of the honesty of the response). We conducted a third experiment in 
an attempt to enhance the potential practical utility of this technique by using verbal rather than motor 
responses. In Experiment 3, prior to and interleaved with the deception task, participants answered a 
set of questions by pressing the two response keys whilst simultaneously producing a corresponding 
loud verbal response (“yes”/”no”). following this motor-verbal association stage (lasting ∼ 2.5 h) 
participants completed a deception task whilst providing only verbal responses. We hypothesised that 
verbal responses that were strongly associated with a manual response would trigger a similar 
manual response conflict to that observed in our first experiments. 
 6. Experiment 3 
6.1. Method 
We employed identical stimuli, apparatus and statistical analyses to those used in Experiment 1. Four 
right-handed participants (4 females, mean age = 25.3, SD = 2.9) were tested. 
6.2. Procedure 
One hundred simple yes/no type questions served as training material, establishing the association 
between verbal and motor responses. This set of questions was randomised and presented 17.5 
times during the experiment. Within these phases, on each trial one question was presented for 
2500 ms followed by a tone, after which participants depressed one of the two response keys 
indicating yes/no whilst simultaneously saying “yes”/“no”. There were 1600 such trials at the start of 
the experiment. A shorter top-up phase (50 trials) followed each of the first three deception blocks. 
The deception task consisted of four blocks each proceeded by instructions to lie about one of the 
four groups of faces identified in Experiment 2. Block order was randomised for each participant. 
Each trial consisted of preparatory (“Famous?”), then instructive (face) then imperative (tone) stimuli, 
with timing as per Experiment 1 (Fig. 1c). Participants relaxed their hands entirely, and two response 
pedals were used by an experimenter to register verbal responses. We opted to keep a priori 
expectations regarding the two digits equal (as in Experiment 1) but also use an easy-to-remember 
rule to categorise the faces that participants needed to lie about (as in Experiment 2). In each block, 
the four faces from the selected lie group (e.g. politicians), along with two other randomly selected 
famous faces (e.g. two actors) and their two matching non-famous faces (so overall four lie-faces and 
four true-faces) were presented six times each accompanied by TMS (with two presentations at each 
stimulation interval, here 20,220 and 520 ms). Note that each stimulus was used once as a TMS lie 
stimulus and once as a TMS true stimulus across the whole experiment. In any given block, the 
remaining eight ‘filler’ faces were presented without TMS. Six of these, which required the same 
response as that of the lie group, were presented twice each, and the two remaining faces, which 
required the opposite response, were presented 18 times each. This yielded an equal number of yes 
and no responses in each block. Hence, each block consisted of 96 pseudo-randomly ordered trials 
(except that TMS could not occur on two consecutive trials). 
 7. Results and discussion 
Although the whole procedure was a lengthy one (∼5 h), trial exclusions as a result of involuntary 
muscle activation were greatly reduced (overall mean exclusion rate 1.3%, SD = 0.1). This study also 
generated a relatively low percentage of incorrect responses (mean = 2.4%, SD = 1.9). This may be 
explained by the use of a preparatory period as in Experiment 1, combined with the easily identified 
lie and truth sets used in Experiment 2. MEP data again suggested activation of motor plans and 
response conflict in hand motor areas, this time generated by verbal responding. This was expressed 
in a significant three-way interaction (F(2,6) = 8.5, p < 0.05, ) between honesty (verbal 
lie/truth), associated digit, and interval (Fig. 3c). When broken down, the two-way interaction between 
honesty and digit was significant only for the middle stimulation interval 
(F(1,3) = 19.4, p < 0.05, ). Paired-sample t-tests found the MEP of the non-responding 
digit in truth trials to be significantly smaller than that of the non-responding digit in deception trials 
(t(3) = 4.43, p < 0.05) but this was not the case in the responding finger (t(3) = −0.7, p = 0.4). Like 
Experiment 1, this experiment used a preparatory period. Whereas in Experiment 1, TMS was first 
delivered 200 ms after stimulus onset, which was evidently sufficient time for a motor plan to develop 
in the non-responding digit during deception, in Experiment 3 a shorter TMS interval (20 ms) revealed 
baseline expectations (i.e. no preference for either response) and helped to drive an interaction with 
TMS interval. Intriguingly, the interaction also showed the dissipation of the erroneous motor plan by 
520 ms, something which never occurred (even after 800 ms) in Experiment 1. This is most likely 
explained by the associative nature of the motor plan that was being assessed in Experiment 3: the 
fact that it emerged at all is impressive; for it to have been maintained throughout preparation for 
a different response would have been astonishing. 
 8. General discussion 
Using single-pulse TMS, we examined whether conflict between competing responses in M1 can 
discriminate between intentionally false and true facial recognition. In Experiments 1 and 2 naïve 
participants used their little finger or thumb to indicate familiarity with famous and unknown faces. In 
Experiment 3 participants provided verbal responses which had been associated in advance with the 
same manual responses. By stimulating M1 prior to response execution, we could compare the MEPs 
linked to the two competing responses. We compared MEPs in correct trials from the digit that was 
used (the “responding digit”) and the passive digit (the “non-responding digit”). In all three 
experiments we identified critical times when the MEPs of the non-responding digit were greater than 
the MEPs of the responding digit in trials where the former coded the truth, i.e. when subjects lied. By 
contrast, MEPs of the non-responding digit were smaller than the MEPs of the responding digit when 
the former response coded a lie, i.e. when subjects told the truth. 
Our data are suggestive of intra-hemispheric mutual inhibition during response preparation. In the 
second experiment, as RT unfolded the population of neurons representing the to-be-executed 
response became increasingly active whilst the alternative response appeared inhibited. Notably, this 
progressive process was biased or delayed in deception trials: the truth was initially prepared, then 
some neural signal prompted the alternative response (i.e. the lie) to become preeminent. Biasing 
influences could originate from prefrontal and cingulate areas ( [Frith, 2000], [Passingham, 
1993] and [Lau et al., 2006]). Both areas have been implicated previously in the resolution of 
response conflicts and the act of deception ( [Abe et al., 2006], [Abe et al., 2007], [Bhatt et al., 
2009], [Kozel et al., 2004], [Lee et al., 2010], [Langleben et al., 2005], [Nunez et al., 
2005] and [Schumacher et al., 2010]). Excitability of specific populations in M1 might for example be 
biased via cortico-cortical pathways to supplementary motor area (SMA), or striatal projections to M1 
and the SMA. 
Our results cannot be explained by early visual priming effects on M1 induced by the familiar faces, 
as we assessed two kinds of lying (denial for famous faces and confabulation for unknown faces) and 
no meaningful interactions were found with this factor. We do not claim that the neural signature we 
have observed here is unique to lying. In fact, we are quite certain that what it fundamentally reflects 
is response competition. Hence we are comfortable with various levels of explanation for our effect. 
For example, in our experiments lies were less frequent relative to truthful responses, so our results 
could reflect a higher-order task-switching effect (i.e. lying more often represented a shift from one 
response set to a reversed response set than did truthful responding). This account is not problematic 
for our interpretation, because our response frequencies were ecologically valid: lying really is, by and 
large, a reversal from a standard task set to an infrequent deceptive one. The key point is that lying 
will usually represent a response conflict, and can be detected on this basis. We do, however, note 
that in this paradigm lying was for low stakes. Future studies could incorporate a tangible punishment 
and reward system, like that which accompanies real-life deception. Such studies should also 
investigate the degree to which the partial activation of the truth is determined by the frequency of 
lying within the task (e.g. Verschuere et al., 2011). 
Neurobiological principles of response selection can also be tested against our data. The parallel 
process of excitation of one response and the suppression of the alternative one argues against 
diffusion models of decision making that stipulate independent activation in both of two response 
alternatives in a race, particularly in regard to intra-hemispheric competition (Smith and Ratcliff, 
2004). Put differently, our data support the notion of reciprocal inhibition between two motor response 
alternatives (although this inhibition may not be direct). Inhibitory links which still allow activation of 
multiple response alternatives are central to the leaky competing accumulator model of simple 
perceptual choices (Usher and McClelland, 2001) and the affordance competition model of motor 
decision making (Cisek, 2007). 
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that verbal responses can be associated with digit-specific motor 
plans strongly enough to trigger them involuntarily. A verbal lie will then briefly activate 
a manual motor plan associated with the truth, presumably via the activation of the verbal truth plan. 
This is consistent with the theory of event coding (Hommel et al., 2001). The finding may remove one 
barrier to developing a lie detector based on TMS. However, in many techniques, lie-detection 
accuracy has been shown to be weakened by participants’ countermeasures (e.g. when using the 
ERP P300; [Mertens and Allen, 2008] and [Rosenfeld et al., 2001]). These would also hamper MEP-
based detection, which requires voluntary muscle relaxation. 
In summary, we have demonstrated how evolving motor activity in M1 can unmask intentionally 
hidden information. In our experiments, deception resulted in competition between the true and 
deceitful responses, detectable in average MEP sizes prior to execution. We conclude, based on the 
simultaneous and dynamic modulation of two motor plans, that decision-making operations do not 
serially precede the generation of motor plans even when the goal is deception. By demonstrating the 
presence of an M1 response conflict in deception, we offer an original platform for developing lie-
detection techniques whilst also shedding light on the dynamics of response competition. 
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